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I.  INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty years ago, when I was the director of the New Jersey Division of 
Mental Health Advocacy, I litigated a case that changed my life.1  That case—Falter 
v. Veterans Administration—was about the way veterans with mental illness (at that 
time, especially Vietnam veterans) were treated at the Veterans Administration 
(“VA”) Medical Center in Lyons, New Jersey.2  Following the litigation in the Falter 
case, the VA promulgated the first Patients’ Bill of Rights on behalf of persons in its 
facilities,3 and attention was paid to substantive areas of patients’ rights that all too 
often were previously ignored,4 areas that have fallen again mostly into desuetude 
since the case.5
But what has lasted with me most vividly from Falter was one line of Judge 
Harold Ackerman’s initial decision: “[In this opinion], I am referring to how 
[plaintiffs] are treated as human beings.”6  I read that line in the slip opinion, and for 
a moment, my breath stopped.  Prior to that time, I had been representing persons 
with mental disabilities for nearly a decade,7 and litigated other class actions that 
truly had a vast impact on the New Jersey mental health system.8  But never before 
had a judge written a line like this in an opinion in one of my cases.
1. The introduction relates Michael Perlin’s personal account of the Falter case and its importance to 
mental health law.  We use the f irst-person pronoun here to avoid awkwardness (and factual 
inaccuracy).  
2. 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980).
3. Falter v. Veterans Admin., 632 F. Supp. 196, 203 (D.N.J. 1986) (“In December 1982, the V.A. Patients’ 
Bill of Rights was promulgated.”).
4. See, e.g., id. at 203–08 (noting patients’ rights such as rights to privacy while using telephones, to privacy 
in reading mail, to visitation, and to attend religious services).
5. See Michael L. Perlin, “Through the Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, 
Professor ten Broek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. (forthcoming 
2008) (manuscript at 4–5, on file with author) (discussing the paucity of recent developments in the area 
of “other institutional rights” in patients’ rights litigation).
6. Falter, 502 F. Supp. at 1185.
7. For a discussion of my early work in this context, see Michael L. Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: 
Mental Disability on Trial xviii (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Hidden Prejudice]; Michael L. 
Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability 
Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 3, 6–8 (1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Half-
Wracked].
8. See, e.g., Doe v. Klein, No. L12088-74 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (final order), reprinted in 1 
Ment. Dis. L. Rep. 475 (1977), and discussed in 2 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law: 
Civil and Criminal § 3A-8, at 86 n.655 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Mental Disability 
Law] (discussing the right of patients to specific staffing ratios in different state hospital units); 
Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L41293-75 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), reprinted in 5 Perlin, 
Mental Disability Law, supra, § 14-4, at 66–74 (2d ed. 2002), and discussed in 2 Perlin, Mental 
Disability Law, supra, § 3C-7.ii, at 441–42 (discussing the right of patients to participate in voluntary, 
therapeutic compensated work programs as an aspect of the right to treatment); Dixon v. Cahill, No. 
L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reprinted in 5 Perlin, Mental Disability Law, 
supra, § 14-7, at 119–21 (2d ed. 2002), and discussed in Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: 
The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 Ala. 
L. Rev. 193, 206–07 n.94 (2000) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (applying Due Process 
Clause to incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants)).  
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I have thought about this sentence countless times in the intervening twenty-
eight years (and have cited it many, many times).9  When I became a professor and 
turned my scholarly attention to the ravages of sanism10 and pretextuality,11 and how 
they have contaminated—and continue to contaminate—all of mental disability law, 
this sentence was always the foil, the response to the bigoted statements made to me 
so many times by other judges.12  If only all judges deciding cases involving persons 
with mental disabilities got what Judge Ackerman expressed in this opinion, how 
different the legal landscape would be.
9. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role 
and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 754 n.120 
(2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Best Friend]; Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: 
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 683, 698 n.84 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers]; 
Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disability Law Through the 
Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 535, 541 n.49 (2002–03) [hereinafter Perlin, Things Have 
Changed]; Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, 
Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 775, 789 (1998).
10. I have defined sanism as:
  [A]n irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices 
that cause (and are ref lected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, 
and ethnic bigotry.  It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.  Sanism 
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.  It is based predominantly upon 
stereotype, myth, superstition, and de-individualization, and is sustained and perpetuated 
by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense” (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an 
unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process. 
 Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 7, at 4–5; see also Perlin, Hidden Prejudice, supra note 7, at xviii–xix. 
On the roots of such stigma, see generally Patrick Corrigan et al., From Whence Comes Mental Illness 
Stigma?, 49 Int’l J. Soc’l Psychiatry 142 (2003).
11. Pretextuality refers to the ways in which courts 
  accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in 
dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, 
especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in 
order to achieve desired ends.  This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in 
the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and 
reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt 
testifying.  
 Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance 
of “Ordinary Common Sense”, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 1, 25 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, She 
Breaks Just Like a Little Girl]; see also Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: 
Of “Ordinary Common Sense,”  Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 131, 135 (1991); infra text accompanying note 76.
12. No example is perhaps as chilling as the following:
  Sometime after the trial court’s decision in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 
1978) (granting involuntarily committed mental patients a limited right to refuse 
medication), I had occasion to speak to a state court trial judge about the Rennie case.  He 
asked me, “Michael, do you know what I would have done had you brought Rennie before 
me?” (the Rennie case was litigated by counsel in the N.J. Division of Mental Health 
Advocacy; I was director of the Division at that time).  I replied, “No,” and he then 
answered, “I’d’ve taken the son-of-a-bitch behind the courthouse and had him shot.”
 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 407, 421 n.94 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, A 
Law of Healing].
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The Falter opinion also contains the roots of what has come to be known as 
therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”).  TJ presents a new model by which we can assess 
the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects mentally disabled 
individuals; study the role of the law as a therapeutic agent; recognize that substantive 
rules, legal procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic consequences; and question whether such rules, procedures, and roles can 
or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not 
subordinating due process principles.13  Judge Ackerman’s insight—that the Falter 
case was, basically, about whether the plaintiffs, institutionalized because of their 
mental disability, were treated “as human beings”—is as concise and perfect an 
expression of TJ as exists in the legal canon.14 
This is especially important, for the law can and should use TJ as a mechanism 
“to expose pretextuality and strip bare the law’s sanist façade,”15 and thus become a 
powerful tool to serve as “a means of attacking and uprooting ‘the we/they distinction 
that has traditionally plagued and stigmatized the mentally disabled.’”16  It is an 
approach that scholars, litigators, decision-makers, and policymakers must always 
keep in mind.
The papers that are collected in this issue of the New York Law School Law 
Review all, in different ways, explore this theme and the tension that comes with it.17  
One article deals with the ways that society treats sex offenders.18  Another article 
deals with the ways society provides advocacy services to persons institutionalized 
because of mental disabilities.19  Two articles deal with core aspects of institutional 
mental disability law (civil commitment and institutional rights),20 and one note deals 
13. See Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 9, at 751.
14. The Falter case preceded the publication of Professor David Wexler’s first TJ book by a decade.  See 
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (1990).
15. Perlin, Things Have Changed, supra note 9, at 544.
16. Perlin, Hidden Prejudice, supra note 7, at 301 (quoting David B. Wexler, New Directions in 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. 
Rts. 759, 776 (1993)).
17. All of these papers also have a thematic connection to New York Law School.  They were either authored 
by New York Law School adjunct professors or presented at the 30th International Congress on Law 
and Mental Health, in Padua, Italy, on panels where Perlin participated or moderated.  See XXXth 
International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Final Program, http://ialmh.org/Padua2007/
Final_Program.doc (last visited Nov. 25, 2008) (listing presentations).
18. John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 31 
(2008) (this issue).
19. Karen O. Talley, Independent Protection and Advocacy:  The Role of Counsel in Institutional Settings, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2008) (this issue).
20. Henry A. Dlugacz, Outpatient Commitment: Some Thoughts on Promoting a Meaning ful Dialogue, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 79 (2008) (this issue); Maureen Hackett, Smoke-Free State Psychiatric Facility 
Grounds: Is Legislation Necessary and Appropriate to Remove Tobacco from These Treatment Settings?, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 99 (2008) (this issue). 
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with medical errors and health care confidentiality.21  But all of these papers share a 
constant leitmotif: the ways that society does not take seriously the impact of 
institutionalization on persons with mental disabilities,22 and the ways that society 
continues to marginalize and dehumanize such individuals, sometimes under the 
guise of public protection, sometimes under the guise of benevolence.  
Moreover, an underlying concern of these papers is the extent to which 
hospitalization may affect other institutions—such as the criminal justice system—in 
ways that are potentially damaging to the rights of citizens generally.  When read 
together as a unit, these papers reinforce—nearly two decades after the initial Falter 
opinion was published—Judge Ackerman’s prescient admonition.  
In this essay, John Douard and I will discuss the papers that comprise this 
extraordinary symposium, keeping in mind this unifying theme.  In Part II, we will 
discuss the shift from what criminologists call the carceral state to the therapeutic 
state, and the implications of that change.  In Part III, we will discuss the papers in 
this special issue.  In closing, we will seek to identify the common strands of 
scholarship that are reflected in these papers and that, we believe, unify critique of 
this area of the law.  
Our title comes from Bob Dylan’s majestic and early anthem, My Back Pages, 
best known for its verse, “I was so much older then/I’m younger than that now.”23  
The line that we have chosen comes from this verse: 
 A self-ordained professor’s tongue
 Too serious to fool
 Spouted out that liberty
 Is just equality in school 
 “Equality,” I spoke the word
 As if a wedding vow.
 Ah, but I was so much older then, 
 I’m younger than that now.24
In an unpublished work, I explained why I used this lyric as the title of that 
paper:25
This lyric may be the reason I went to law school (it was a long time ago, and 
my memory is a little hazy).  I tell it to people, but who knows?  The point is 
21. Katherine Mikk, Making the Plaintiff ’s Bar Earn Its Keep: Rethinking the Hospital Incident Report, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 133 (2008) (this issue). 
22. Although Mikk’s note deals broadly with health care and hospitals, the issues she considers are as 
pronounced—perhaps more pronounced—in matters involving persons with mental disabilities.  See, e.g., 
David R. Katner, Confidentiality and Juvenile Mental Health Records in Dependency Proceedings, 12 Wm. 
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 511 (2004).
23. Bob Dylan, My Back Pages, on Another Side of Bob Dylan (Columbia Records 1964).
24. Id.  Those who have visited Perlin’s office may recall that this verse is on the outside door.
25. Michael L. Perlin, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding Vow”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
and Social Justice (Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper, presented at conference at John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, New York) (on file with author).
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that, for many persons, the idea of a legal system that incorporates concepts of 
the “autonomous individual” has been a myth (or, perhaps, more accurately, a 
cruel hoax) for centuries.  If the “autonomous individual” was truly the legal 
system’s focus, we would not—50 years after Brown, 35 years after Jackson v. 
Indiana, and  30 years after Roe v. Wade—acknowledge that the disenfranchised 
and insular minorities that were the subject of the Supreme Court’s famous 
“footnote 4” in the Carolene Products case nearly 70 years ago remain,26 all too 
often, disenfranchised and insular.
I believe that the use of TJ—as a tool for the exposure of these hoaxes and as 
a mechanism for advancing social justice is a way (perhaps the only way) to 
redeem the law for persons who have been marginalized. And perhaps, we 
will finally be able to say, to extend Dylan’s equality/wedding metaphor, “I 
do.”27
We come back to this lyric for this paper, because we believe that the individuals 
that all of the authors in this issue are writing about are the “disenfranchised and 
insular” that were the concern of the U.S. Supreme Court in Carolene Products and 
the twenty-three year old Bob Dylan.  The line that we are using for the title has 
been quoted epigrammatically in prior law review articles, but has never before been 
deployed in a paper about this universe of disenfranchised and marginalized 
individuals.28  The relationship between “equality” and “liberty” has been a vexed 
one in the history of political philosophy, but Dylan’s lyric captures the extent to 
which we speak these words without thinking about their scope and meaning.  In the 
papers collected here, the focus is on a category of persons who too often are not 
regarded as worthy of equal concern and respect: persons with mental disabilities. 
Because such persons are often treated as less than equal citizens, the extent to which 
they are unjustly deprived of liberty goes unnoticed.  This symposium issue is 
intended to help rectify that situation.
II.  FROM THE CARCERAL STATE TO THE THERAPEUTIC STATE 
A nation’s criminal justice system reflects its primal fears of social anomie.  The 
manner in which violent offenders are treated in the prison system of the United 
States is only the most superficial expression of those fears.  Indeed, periodic 
movements to improve prison conditions, and to develop humane approaches to 
incarceration, may mask far more disturbing anxieties about social crises that threaten 
to undermine the social norms that structure our daily lives—norms regarding the 
26. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
27. Perlin, supra note 25, manuscript at 18–19.
28. For prior law review articles quoting this line, see James M. Binnall, Deterrence Is Down and Social Costs 
Are Up: A Parolee Revisits Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 199, 199 
(2007); Dennis Ford Eagan, The Past, Present, and Future of School Desegregation Law in Massachusetts, 
34 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 541, 541 (2001).  For a discussion on marginalization and mental disability in a 
related context, see Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of 
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 63 (1991).
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nature of families, the stability of communities, the proprieties of sexual conduct, 
and, more generally, the moral bonds and constraints of what sociologist Norbert 
Elias called “the civilizing process.”29
Criminologists describe the United States as a carceral or penal state, with a 
social organization shaped by methods of mass incarceration.30  Since the mid-1970s, 
the dominant strategy for addressing violations of social rules has been imprisonment, 
with increasingly lengthy prison terms for the most violent crimes committed against 
the most vulnerable social groups.31
Recently, however, new strategies of social control are emerging that threaten or 
promise, depending on one’s point of view, to utilize civil commitment and new 
technologies of tracking offenders indefinitely.32  These strategies tie professions 
designed to diagnose and treat mental disorders—psychiatry and psychology—to the 
criminal justice system with the aim of predicting and preventing putatively dangerous 
conduct.33  Preventive detention, glossed as treatment rather than punishment, would 
supplant long prison terms for persons who can be identified as at high risk for 
committing dangerous crimes because of a mental illness or personality disorder.34
Civil commitment statutes, the most explicit model of preventive detention, 
make it possible to detain convicted sex offenders at the expiration of their prison 
terms.35  A close cousin of institutional preventive detention in this area is Megan’s 
Law, a version of which has been implemented in every state.36  Megan’s Law utilizes 
29. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations 
(Erik Dunning et al. eds., Edmund Jepbcott trans., 2000).
30. See Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in 
America (2006); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society 27–73 (2001); Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and 
the Carceral State, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 235 (2008); Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: 
The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1693 (2006).
31. See Michael Tonry, Crime and Punishment in America, in The Handbook of Crime and Punishment 
3 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); James Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in Crime 36–37 (James 
Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995).
32. See Cecil E. Greek, Tracking Probationers in Space and Time: The Convergence of GIS and GPS Systems, 66 
Federal Probation 51 (2002); Mara Lynn Krongard, A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of 
Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (2002).
33. See Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender 
Commitments, 72 Ind. L.J. 157 (1996).  
34. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001). 
35. For a discussion of this issue, see Aman Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The 
Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 489, 490 (2006).  
36. See David S. DeMatteo, Note, Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A.—Home of Beautiful Scenery (And a Convicted 
Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 581, 
632 (1998).
16
INTRODUCTION
a complex web of restrictions on the movements of sex offenders released into the 
community, resulting in a kind of de-institutionalized preventive detention.37
We now turn to a discussion of the individual papers in this symposium issue, 
keeping in mind at all times the issues of social control and the ways that persons 
with mental disabilities (especially those institutionalized) are systematically 
treated.
III. THE PAPERS IN THIS ISSUE
A. Douard  
The article by John Douard may strike many readers as contrary and wholly 
counterintuitive to a useful social strategy for reducing recidivism rates among the 
most reviled of criminal offenders: sex offenders.38  His article is nothing less than a 
repudiation of the entire enterprise of demonizing the “monstrous” sex offender.39 
His article forces us to consider how our blind fury—in the light of a series of horrific 
and heavily publicized sexual crimes against young children—has led us to enact a 
series of purportedly prophylactic laws that are based in large part on facts-not-in-
evidence about (1) the incidence of sexually violent crime, (2) the relationships 
between offenders and victims, (3) the treatability of victims, and (4) the role of 
mental disorders in the commission of sex offenses.40  The ways sex offenders are 
framed rhetorically as monsters shape the social and legal response to sex offending 
far more than empirical data about recidivism rates warrant.  Moreover, mentally-ill 
people are stigmatized in the aggregate as being disproporationately and 
idiosyncratically dangerous when sex offenders are categorized as persons with 
mental disorders.
Douard argues that sex offenders are framed as monsters, and their behavior is 
framed as monstrous, denying them basic characteristics of personhood: the capacity 
to control one’s sexual behavior and normal cognitive and affective abilities of 
persons.41  The framing of sex offenders as monsters serves an important social 
function: scapegoats for anxieties about social disorder.  Sex offenders are a kind of 
domestic terrorist, threatening our social norms of stability, love, and parenting 
responsibility.42  That these norms may be intrinsically unstable in the modern world 
37. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 
Hastings L.J. 829, 902–07 (2000); Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the 
New Penology, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 452 (1998); cf. Dlugacz, supra note 20.  
38. Douard, supra note 18.
39. Id. at 41–45.
40. See Ahluwalia, supra note 35, at 494; R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A 
Meta-analysis of Sex Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 348 (1998). 
41. Douard, supra note 18, at 37; see also John Douard, Loathing the Sinner, Medicalizing the Sin: Why 
Sexually Violent Predator Statutes Are Unjust, 30 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 36 (2007). 
42. See Heather Ellis Cucolo, Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent 
Predators (June 5, 2007) (unpublished paper, presented at 30th International Congress on Law and 
Mental Health, Padua, Italy), as discussed in Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else 
17
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is a possibility society cannot easily accept, because it implicates everyone. 
Stigmatizing scapegoats distracts individuals from their own roles in producing social 
anomie.  Society has an ally in creating this class of scapegoats: psychiatric and other 
mental health experts, whose diagnoses and testimony are legally the most powerful 
instruments in grounding civil commitment of convicted offenders who have served 
their terms in prison, and in constraining and stigmatizing released sex offenders 
when they attempt to re-enter society.43
The rhetoric of rampant child sexual abuse in the media and among lawmakers 
is part of the dramatic narrative of sexual identity and power that is also used to 
symbolically construct the role of sex and its repression in American society as a 
whole.44  Because sex offenders are at loose in society, threatening not only our 
children but our social stability, some people believe that society needs to affirm the 
boundary between the normal and the abnormal.  The alternative would be to 
acknowledge that the impulses we believe are the causal source of sexual deviance are 
the all-too-human impulses to which we may all be subject.  The only solution then, 
according to those in social power, is to purify sexual deviance, often with the law, by 
isolating the shameful source of deviance and rendering it harmless.
But of course, as Douard concludes, this is no solution at all to the very real 
harmful sexual conduct of child sex abusers, because it makes treatment both too 
mundane to serve our symbolic needs and impossible to achieve.  The result is a 
denial of the humanity of sex offenders, and refusal to do the work required by 
rehabilitation and re-entry.  It is a form of what Perlin calls pretextuality.45  
Little has changed in the decade since Perlin wrote the following words about 
the most pretextual of all opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. 
Hendricks:46
Hendricks—in upholding a state law sanctioning long-term institutionalization 
of “sexually violent predators”—is not simply, in my mind, a constitutionally 
indefensible and intellectually muddled opinion.  It is also a pretextual 
opinion. Mental disability law is permeated by a kind of meretricious 
pretextuality that is outcome-driven, acontextual and amoral. The Hendricks 
Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental 
Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, U. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, on 
file with author).
43. See John Q. La Fond &  Mary L. Durham, Back to the Asylum: The Future of Mental Health 
Law and Policy in the United States 156 (1992); Michael L. Perlin et al., “The Witness Who 
Saw/He Left Little Doubt”: A Comparative Consideration of Expert Testimony in Mental Disability Law 
Cases, J. Investigative Psychol. & Offender Profiling (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4, on 
file with author) (“Just as we ‘tend to ignore, subordinate or trivialize behavioral research in this area, 
especially when acknowledging that such research would be cognitively dissonant with our intuitive-
albeit empirically f lawed views,’ we give such evidence too much weight when it reinforces our previously 
internalized positions.” (quoting Perlin, A Law of Healing, supra note 12, at 422)).
44. See generally Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Conceptions of the Child Molester in 
Modern America (1998).
45. For a definition of pretextuality, see supra note 11.  
46. 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).
18
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case ref lects this pretextuality, and in so doing, reveals to us much of what is 
wrong with the development of mental disability law jurisprudence.47
But now consider the meretricious role of “ordinary common sense” (“OCS”).48  
Underlying much pretextuality is society’s use of OCS, a “powerful unconscious 
animator of legal decision making.”49  “[W]here defendants do not conform to 
‘popular images of craziness,’ the notion of handicapping mental disability is f latly 
and unthinkingly rejected.”50  In arguing why it is essential to understand OCS if one 
is to understand why insanity defense attitudes have developed as they have, Perlin 
has written:
Not only is it “preref lective” and “self-evident,” it is susceptible to precisely 
the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmaking that has traditionally 
typified insanity defense legislation and litigation.  It also ignores our rich, 
cultural, heterogenic fabric that makes futile any attempt to establish a unitary 
level of OCS to govern decision making in an area where we have traditionally 
been willing to base substantive criminal law doctrine on medieval conceptions 
of sin, redemption, and religiosity.51
We believe that it is society’s reliance on OCS—a self-referential, non-reflective, 
self-absorbed way of seeing the world at large and the legal system in particular—
that helps to illuminate much of what happens when people think about the sorts of 
cases discussed in Douard’s article.  Individuals seek to simplify their information-
processing tasks by engaging in heuristic thinking and by taking refuge in a false 
OCS.52  Both of these limiting and narrowing devices cut the individual adrift from 
critical thinking and both offer overly-pat solutions for complex behavior.  OCS, 
simply put, is an “incomplete and imperfect tool by which to assess criminality.”53
Our students’ responses in class mirror these attitudes.  Perlin teaches Survey of 
Mental Disability Law each fall.54  Students are, by and large, receptive to 
47. Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success Like Failure/And Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretextuality 
of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247, 1248–49 (1998).
48. See Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl, supra note 11, at 25; Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which 
Separated You from Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture 
of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375, 1376 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Insanity Defense].
49. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and Heuristic 
Reasoning, 69 Neb. L. Rev. 3, 22–23 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, OCS and Heuristic Reasoning]. 
50. Id. at 24 (quoting Harold Lasswell, Foreward to Richard Arens, The Insanity Defense xi (1974)).
51. Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
52. Heuristics are “cognitive-simplifying devices that frequently lead to systematically erroneous decisions 
through ignoring or misusing rationally useful information.”  Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A 
Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 39, 57 n.115 
(1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Fatal Assumption].
53. Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 291 (1994); see also Perlin, She 
Breaks Just Like a Little Girl, supra note 11, at 26.
54. New York Law School also offers a separate stand-alone course in Sex Offenders.  See New York Law 
School: Online Program in Mental Disability Law, http://www.nyls.edu/mdl (last visited Sept. 20, 
2008).  As the course description explains:
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counterintuitive information (e.g., that not all mental patients are dangerous to 
others; that predictions of dangerousness are difficult to make,55 and most predictive 
errors are “false positives”;56 that most persons with serious mental illness are 
competent to engage in medication decision-making).57  But they reject—flatly and 
  This course will review contemporary public policy regarding sexually coercive behavior.  
A major focus will be the aggressive legislative approaches to sexual violence developed in 
the United States over the past 15 years.  We will examine and evaluate these controversial 
legal approaches, as well as alternative approaches to the societal effort to address sexual 
violence.  The course will include an examination of the current state of social science 
research into sexual violence, including etiology, classification, treatment, supervision, 
recidivism, and risk assessment.  Our examination of legislative approaches to sexual 
violence will seek an understanding of the operation of these laws, the constitutional 
litigation challenging them, the legal issues currently in controversy, and an attempt to 
assess their efficacy as part of a system for addressing sexual violence in society.  The 
course will address issues at a variety of levels of abstraction, examining the morality of the 
laws, their implications for public policy and the fight against sexual violence, as well as 
the practical skills and knowledge necessary for lawyers and other professionals to operate 
effectively.
 New York Law School, Online Mental Disability Law Program: Course Description, http://nyls.edu/
pages/167.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
55. The inability of psychiatric professionals to predict violence has been specifically recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1993) (There are “difficulties inherent 
in diagnosis of mental illness.  It is thus no surprise that many psychiatric predictions of future violent 
behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.” (internal citation omitted)).
56. Perlin has explained the following about false positives:
   Errors in overpredicting violence are known as “false positives,” i.e., a person 
falsely predicted to be dangerous, as opposed to “false negatives,” i.e., a person falsely 
predicted to be not dangerous. See, e.g., Wilkins, The Case for Prediction, in 3 Crime & 
Justice 375 (1971).  False positives have generally been “seen as preferable” errors for 
medical predictors to make.  See, e.g., H. Steadman & J. Cocozza, Careers of the 
Criminally Insane 110 (1974).  But see, e.g., Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct 
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 717, 731 (1972) 
(“[W]e can afford little tolerance, indeed, of prediction methods that show a high yield of 
false positives.”). 
   Ironically, researchers have suggested that the false negative rate is much lower 
than the false positive rate.  See, e.g., Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 
18 Crime & Delinq. 393, 394 (1972) (“The best prediction available today, for even the 
most refined set of offenders, is that any particular member of that set will not become 
violent.”).  See generally Petrunik, The Politics of Dangerousness, 5 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 
225, 244 (1982) (discussing heavy media focus on the problem of “false negatives[:] 
individuals diagnosed as insufficiently dangerous enough to confine (or as safe enough to 
release) who are later found to have committed serious acts of personal violence or 
nonconsensual sexual offences,” in spite of research reports of a higher level of false 
positives.) (footnote omitted). 
   On the way courts err by making too many “false positives,” see Boehnert, 
Characteristics of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Pleas, 13 Law & Hum.Behav. 31, 38 
(1989).
 Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599, 693 n.441 (1989).
57. See Perlin, Lepers, supra note 9, at 696 (“The presumption in which courts have regularly engaged—that 
there is both a de facto and de jure presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decision 
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without brooking any possible doubt or ambiguity—the presentation of any empirical 
evidence that the recidivism rate among sex offenders is lower than that of many 
other cohorts of felons, and the presentation of any such evidence that some treatment 
programs for sexual offenders are, in fact, successful.58
Douard has exposed students in his undergraduate ethics and philosophy of law 
courses to the major actuarial risk assessment instrument, the Static-99,59 used to 
determine if sex offenders, at the expiration of their prison terms, are highly likely to 
reoffend if released.  The instrument uses only historical and primarily unchangeable 
information about an offender to determine whether they belong to a class of high-
risk offenders.  High scores are presented in court as evidence that offenders should 
be civilly committed pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act.60 
The students are stunned when they learn that they, who have never committed a sex 
offense, nonetheless may have a relatively high Static-99 score on the basis of other 
historical information.61
Every time Detective Benson or Stabler—on NBC’s popular Law and Order: 
SVU program—says, “There’s no cure. And they all do it again,” that speaks to 
society’s OCS about this topic.  Every newspaper article reporting that a sex offender 
was released into the community expresses the public misconception that there are 
reliable and valid ways to assess recidivism risk.  Douard exposes the f laws of this 
OCS, and does it in a sober yet provocative way that is sure to charge the debate in 
this area of law and policy for years.
making—appears to be based on an empirical fallacy.”); Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 137 (1996).
58. See generally Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 40; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Juvenile Statistics, 
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in  (2003) (emphasis added), http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
59. The Static-99 is an actuarial sex offender risk assessment instrument.  See Andrew Harris et al., 
Static-99 Coding Rules Revised—2003, http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/Static-
99-coding-Rules_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).  For further background, see generally Robert A. 
Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 
357 (2006). 
60. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:4-27.24–27.38 (West 2008).
61. The Static-99 utilizes ten risk factors to place sex offenders in recidivism risk categories, some of which 
are not related directly to sex offending.  Each risk factor is assigned a rating of zero, one, two, or three. 
In the case of sex offenders, a score over five represents a high risk to reoffend.  Even a score of two or 
three represents a medium low, but non-negligible, risk to reoffend.  Now, if we score only the non-sex 
offending factors, a subject who is eighteen to just shy of twenty-five years old received a score of one; 
who has not lived with an intimate partner for at least two years receives a score of one; who has been 
convicted of a non-sexual violent offense receives a score of one; and who has had four or more prior 
sentencing dates for any criminal offense receives a score of one.  If the subject scores one of all of these 
non-sexual factors, they have a score of four independently of any sex offenses they may have committed. 
While the students did not commit sex offenses, some of their scores still resulted in showing that they 
had a non-negligible risk.  Thus, while the Static-99 can be used only to place convicted sex offenders in 
categories of recidivism risk, the instrument utilizes non-sexual static risk factors to define an actuarial 
sex offense recidivism risk assessment.
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B. Talley
Karen O. Talley’s paper deals with a topic that is much less controversial—the 
quality and scope of advocacy services made available to persons institutionalized 
because of mental disability—but one that is no less important.  It also shares one 
important commonality with the paper previously discussed as it demonstrates how 
the discourse on this topic is also premised on a fact-not-in-evidence: that robust 
advocacy services are available in abundance to all individuals so institutionalized. 
The data, rather, suggests that, in many jurisdictions, such counsel is woefully 
inadequate, disinterested, uninformed, and often hostile.  A model of “paternalism/
best interests” is substituted for a traditional legal advocacy position, and this 
substitution is rarely questioned.  Few courts have ever grappled with adequacy of 
counsel questions in this context; fewer yet have found assigned counsel in involuntary 
civil commitment proceedings to be inadequate.62  But advocacy, as Talley shows, can 
increase the sense of empowerment experienced by people with mental disabilities 
who are institutionalized only if the advocate has some independence and can help 
clients achieve a measure of legal competence, i.e., can advocate for themselves.
The federally-funded Protection and Advocacy (“P&A”) system began 
twenty-five years ago, after congressional hearings revealed that people with 
disabilities were being warehoused and deprived of basic rights.63  P&A organizations 
are in every state and are mandated to provide protection and advocacy for people 
with disabilities, including mental disabilities.64  Talley, who has twelve years of 
experience as a P&A attorney, lays out the advantages and disadvantages of attorney-
advocates for people with mental disabilities in institutional settings.  She notes that 
P&A attorneys who are assigned to psychiatric facilities, and thus have ongoing 
contact with their clients and with facility staff, can provide much needed 
communication and collaboration with court-appointed counsel.65  Although, the 
mission of P&A attorneys does not generally extend to cases concerning civil 
commitment or court-ordered treatment (where there is a due process right to 
appointed counsel,66 court-appointed attorneys often do not have the knowledge of 
their clients and often cannot or have not nurtured the cooperative relationships with 
institutional staff they need to serve their clients’ interests).67  Thus, P&A attorneys 
can make counsel’s role more effective. 
62. Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 9, at 738.  See generally Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 52, at 39.
63. See Talley, supra note 19, at 56.  See generally 3 Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 8, 
 § 5B-3.2a, at 238–43 (2d ed. 2000).
64. See Talley, supra note 19, at 56.
65. See id. at 70–75.
66. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 976 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A right to counsel in civil 
commitment proceedings may be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s recognition that commitment 
involves a substantial curtailment of liberty and thus requires due process protection.”).  On the right to 
counsel in involuntary civil commitment proceeding in general, see 1 Perlin, supra note 8, § 2B, at 
191–292 (2d ed. 1998).
67. See Talley, supra note 19, at 59.
22
INTRODUCTION
Talley also examines some of the conflicts that P&A attorneys must confront in 
institutional settings.  Where they are informed of abuse of their clients by staff, 
they may have to litigate cases that can affect the trust built up over time with staff. 
P&A attorneys may also have to represent clients who have engaged in abusive 
conduct toward institutional staff members.  Talley concludes that P&A attorneys in 
institutional settings can help to increase the sense of empowerment of people with 
mental disabilities, who are often among the most vulnerable and least powerful 
members of society.68 
Although the intervening years have given us a maturing national P&A system69 
and have seen the expansion of advocacy networks in other nations,70 it is clear that 
there is still much work to be done before we can safely and accurately assert that the 
population in question has access to effective, vigorous, advocacy-centered counsel. 
All too often, the charge leveled by Judge David Bazelon in 1973—that lawyers 
assigned to represent criminal defendants with mental disabilities are “walking 
violations of the Sixth Amendment”—still rings true.71
Talley’s paper demands that in the face of sanism,72 advocacy should foster 
empowerment,73 and that advocates should make clients into “effective self-
advocates.”74  Sanism permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all 
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and 
expert and lay witnesses.  Its corrosive effects have warped mental disability law 
jurisprudence in involuntary civil commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all 
aspects of the criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing).  It reflects what civil 
rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized as the “pathology of oppression.”75 
It is essential that lawyers—both occasional counsel and regularly-appointed 
counsel—begin to confront sanism and attack pretextuality as part of their advocacy 
role in precisely the ways that Talley suggests.76  Also consider the role of pretextuality. 
Pretextuality’s poisonous nature is well known to frequent consumers of judicial 
services in this area: to mental health advocates and other public defender/legal aid/
68. See id. at 75.
69. For a complete description of the Protection and Advocacy System, see National Disability Rights 
Network, http://www.napas.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
70. See National Disability Authority, Exploring Advocacy: Full Report (2003), available at 
http://www.nda.ie.
71. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973).
72. For a definition of sanism, see supra note 10.  
73. See Talley, supra note 19, at 75.
74. Id.  Inquiries into the role of self-advocacy are not new.  For a discussion of the role of consumer groups 
in shaping mental health law policy, see Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: 
Law Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25 
(1992).
75. Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 7, at 9; Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 374 
(1992).
76. Perlin, Hidden Prejudice, supra note 7, at 32–33.
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legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and criminal defendants who are 
mentally disabled, to prosecutors and state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, 
to judges who regularly hear such cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most 
importantly, to the person with a mental disability involved in the litigation in 
question.77
Talley’s paper is a tonic for much of what ails mental health law.78  As Talley 
argues, P&A attorneys who work in institutions can and do cut through the sanism 
and pretextuality that affects psychiatric staff and court-appointed attorneys.  In an 
article about sanism and representation of persons with mental disabilities, Perlin 
wrote this several years ago:
In the past two decades, the myth has developed that organized, specialized 
and aggressive counsel is now available to mentally disabled individuals in 
commitment, institutionalization and release matters. The availability of such 
counsel is largely illusory; in many jurisdictions, the level of representation 
remains almost uniformly substandard, and, even within the same jurisdiction, 
the provision of counsel can be “wildly inconsistent.”  Without the presence of 
effective counsel, substantive mental disability law reform recommendations 
may turn into “an empty shell.”  Representation of mentally disabled 
individuals falls far short of even the most minimal model of “client-centered 
counseling.”  What is worse, few courts even seem to notice.79
Our hope is that Talley’s article will force courts to notice. 
C. Dlugacz & Hackett 
The core building blocks of modern mental disability law remain the law of 
involuntary civil commitment and the law of the civil rights of persons institutionalized 
in psychiatric institutions.80  The otherwise-unrelated papers by Dlugacz and Hackett 
explore very different aspects of this area of the law: the constitutionality and 
feasibility of assisted outpatient treatment laws (as exemplified by New York’s well-
known and controversial Kendra’s Law)81 and the constitutionality and feasibility of 
hospital policies that do (or do not) allow patients to smoke tobacco on hospital 
grounds.82  The first of these topics has been the subject of dozens of law review 
77. For a definition of pretextuality, see supra note 11; Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J. L. & Health 15, 32 (1993).
78. Cf. Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 Seattle U. L. Rev. 339, 343 (2000) (“[W]e contend that the 
incorporation of TJ into clinical methods can be a tonic—for students, for teachers, and ultimately, for 
case clients.”).
79. Perlin, Lepers, supra note 9, at 690 (citations omitted).
80. See 1 Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 8, § 2C (2d ed. 1998); 2 Perlin, Mental 
Disability Law, supra note 8, § 3C (2d ed. 1998).
81. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 2008).
82. See generally 2 Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 8, § 3C-6.6 (2d ed. 1999).
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articles and some symposia;83 the second has been the subject of none.  The first 
contains many of the high cards of mental disability law: the balance between 
autonomy and social control, the extent to which a person in the community can still 
be subject to social control, and the right of a person with a mental disability to 
refuse the imposition of antipsychotic medications.  The second, at first blush, 
appears to be an issue of interest to only a handful of hospital administrators.  Yet, as 
these two papers thoughtfully tell us, there is a great overlap of issues in play in both 
cases.  
In his paper, Dlugacz—a practicing lawyer, law professor, and clinical social 
worker—embeds a series of issues, referred to as dialogue points, in his efforts to 
examine “the underlying assumptions of each stakeholder to the [involuntary 
outpatient commitment (“OPC”)] dialogue” in order to help us “examine how the 
interests related to those assumptions are vindicated (or not vindicated) in any 
proposed or existing OPC legislation.”84  He notes the ways that the mass media has 
“reduced the ability for rational discourse about OPC,”85 how our views on OPC are, 
to some extent, a trompe d’oeil illusion (“[w]here you stand on OPC depends upon 
where you sit”),86 noting perceptively that “[e]xamining OPC as an alternative to 
inpatient commitment focuses on fundamentally different aspects of its effects than 
does an analysis viewing OPC as an autonomy reducing statute.”87  He stresses the 
“visceral, polarizing reactions among many stakeholders on all sides of the issue,”88 
urging, in the words of John Monahan and his colleagues, that “[t]he ideologic 
posturing that currently characterizes the field [referring to OPC] must be replaced 
by an evidence-based approach.”89
Dlugacz’s analysis leads him to conclude that advocates in OPC cases 
“significantly influence the outcomes,”90 and asks a question that is, at its base, a pure 
application of TJ to the question at hand: “what services would be useful to, and 
accepted by, any given client, and how would greater consumer participation in the 
development of treatment plans improve adherence to treatment with or without a 
83. See, e.g., Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 
355 (2008); Bruce J. Winick et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment: Kendra’s Law 
as Case Study, 9 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 183 (2003) [hereinafter Winick et al., Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence]; Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 Psychol. 
Pub. Pol’y & L. 107 (2003).
84. Dlugacz, supra note 20, at 83.
85. Id. at 85.
86. Id. at 87.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. at 90.
89. John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment, 52 Psychiatric 
Services 1198, 1198 (2001).
90. Dlugacz, supra note 20, at 90.
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court order?”91  In answering this question, he stresses the significance of—perhaps 
the primacy of—empirical socio-economic data, quoting a report by the New York 
Lawyers for the Public Interest:
There are major racial, ethnic, and geographic disparities throughout New 
York State in the implementation of “Kendra’s Law.”  Black people are almost 
five times as likely as White people to be subjected to this law—which 
dramatically reduces freedom of choice over their treatment and their lives—
and Hispanic people are two and a half times as likely as non-Hispanic White 
people.  People who live in New York City are more than four times as likely 
to be subjected to orders as people living in the rest of the state.  Also, contrary 
to how it has been sold, the law is used mainly on people with multiple 
psychiatric hospitalizations but no histories of hurting others.92
Here, he poses a question that has not received nearly enough attention:
Is the assertion that, in specific instances, the provisions of Kendra’s Law are 
applied disproportionately to people of color because of their membership in 
racial groups? Or is the suggestion that, like other putatively neutral laws or 
social policies, the statute’s negative, disparate impact on racial monitories is 
ref lective of broader social inequities?  If an examination were to reveal the 
former, the issue does not warrant status as a dialogue point, but rather should 
be dealt with promptly and robustly under existing civil rights statutes.93
Dlugacz calls for a textured and nuanced analysis of the underlying issues, and 
this call reminds us how difficult it is to leave dogma behind in consideration of the 
charged issues that are topic of his paper.94
Hackett—a psychiatrist and law professor—looks at the question of the 
implications of the removal of tobacco in state hospital treatment settings, and shows 
how this ostensibly narrow question is, in reality, a surrogate for multiple complex 
questions related to the role of aggression in the hospital milieu.95  Her paper 
demonstrates clearly and forcefully that the removal of tobacco from state hospitals 
91. Id. at 93.  His follow-up questions are also, at their base, the essence of TJ inquiries:
  For an advocate to answer this requires the examination of some tricky questions.  One is 
foundational—what is the role of an advocate in the representation of the mentally disabled?  
But, given the number of jurisdictions nationally and internationally which have adopted 
OPC schema, a second could be characterized as strategic—has the battle engaged in by 
some to defeat the advance of OPC statutes been lost?  If so, should the focus shift toward 
ensuring adequate representation of subjects of OPC proceedings and toward using OPC 
orders as leverage to secure scarce services for clients? 
 Id. at 93 n.60.
92. Id. at 95 (quoting N.Y. Lawyers for Pub. Interest, Implementation of “Kendra’s Law” Is 
Severely Biased, (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://nylpi.org/pub/Kendras_Law_04-07-05.pdf. 
93. Id.
94. See id. at 81–82.
95. See Hackett, supra note 20, at 102.  For an earlier inquiry, see Edward R. Lyon, A Review of the Effects of 
Nicotine on Schizophrenic and Antipsychotic Medications, 50 Psychiatric Services 1346 (1999).
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“creates a less aggression-prone treatment milieu and facilitates a higher likelihood 
for more effective treatment.”96
Her prism for purposes of analysis is a Minnesota law prohibiting the use of 
tobacco at state treatment centers,97 the etiology of that law, the opposition to that 
law, and the need for supplemental prophylactic legislation “to protect the health and 
safety of our most vulnerable citizens.”98  Her conclusion is clear: legislation to remove 
tobacco from state hospitals was medically necessary.99
Hackett’s paper also incorporates important aspects of TJ by demonstrating the 
collateral impacts of a smoking-tolerance policy.  She notes, by way of example, how 
“staff and patients describe feeling intimidated by the intensity of patients’ drive to 
smoke and are fearful of the consequences of interfering with that desire.”100  More 
starkly, she calls our attention to a positive correlation between suicide and smoking101 
and data that suggests that smoking “may actually predispose individuals to develop 
anxiety disorders”102 and major depression.103
When read together, the Dlugacz and Hackett papers ref lect the interplay 
between sanism/pretextuality and TJ.  Dlugacz’s article mirrors Talley’s focus on the 
significance of effective advocacy (a reflection of the reality that inadequate counsel 
often makes the mental disability law process a pretextual sham),104 and his rejection 
of “ideologic posturing”105 harkens back to Judge Bazelon’s admonition that we need 
to be vigilant about not “overgeneraliz[ing] about citizens whom it is easy to 
overgeneralize about.”106  Hackett’s article reminds us of how policies are established 
without due consideration of their impact on the lives of those whose activities are 
being regulated, a ref lection of core sanist behavior.107  Both articles employ a 
TJ-based analysis of the problems at hand as a means of dealing with the underlying 
96. Hackett, supra note 20, at 102.
97. See Minn. Stat. Ann § 246.0141 (2008).
98. Hackett, supra note 20, at 103.
99. Id. at 130.
100. Id. at 118 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of State Mental Health Program Directors, Technical Report 
on Smoking Policy and Treatment in State Operated Psychiatric Facilities 7 (Joseph Parks 
& Peggy Jewell eds., Maile Burke, technical writer, 2006), available at http://www.nasmhpd.org.
101. See id. at 114 (citing David Hemenway et al., Smoking and Suicide Among Nurses, 83 Am. J. Pub. Health 
249, 250 (1993)).  
102. Id. at 112 (citing Jeffrey G. Johnson et al., Association Between Cigarette Smoking and Anxiety Disorders 
During Adolescence and Early Adulthood, 284 JAMA 2348, 2350 (2000)).
103. See id. at 111 (citing Holly E. R. Morrell & Lee M. Cohen, Cigarette Smoking, Anxiety and Depression, 
28 J. Psychopathology & Behav. Assessment. 283, 290 (2006)).
104. See, e.g., Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 9, at 750–52.
105. Dlugacz, supra note 19, at 90.
106. David Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
897, 909 (1975).
107. On our failure to care about what happens to such individuals, and the implications of that failure to 
care, see Perlin, Insanity Defense, supra note 48, at 1425–26 (discussing insanity defense pleaders).
27
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
dilemmas, and both take seriously Judge Ackerman’s observation about how persons 
with mental disabilities are “treated as human beings.”108
D. Mikk
In her note, Katherine Mikk examines the role of hospital incident reports in 
both hospital quality assurance strategies and malpractice litigation.  Mikk’s analysis 
reveals the extent to which OCS may undermine the process of improvement of 
quality of care that incident reports are intended to promote.109  An incident report 
documents the occurrences of unusual events, or events that are outside routine 
hospital procedures.  While it is an internal report hospitals use to improve quality, 
the incident report may also be discoverable by plaintiffs in malpractice lawsuits.  But 
these purposes of the incident report are in tension with one another.  Absent a high 
degree of confidentiality, unusual incidents may not be reported by hospital staff, 
and allowing incident reports to be discoverable violates any confidentiality incident 
reports are thought to enjoy.110  Thus, if we want hospitals to improve hospital 
conditions and reduce medical errors, our legal system will have to ensure that 
incident reports have a high level of confidentiality.  To do so, we must conceive of 
incident reports as documents that “compile the results of a hospital’s investigation 
into what went wrong” for the purpose of improving quality of care.111  According to 
OCS, hospital quality assurance programs are promulgated to decrease hospital 
errors.  However, incident reports compiled by hospitals, which presumably play a 
role in quality assurance programs, become part of litigation.  Because hospital staffs 
loathe enabling lawsuits, the legal role of incident reports may reduce their impact on 
quality of care.  As in other institutional contexts considered in the papers by Talley 
and Hackett, the interests of patients are not always the interests served by 
institutional processes.  Often, concerns about litigation dominate institutional 
decision-making.
IV. CONCLUSION
When taken as a whole, there are multiple important strands of thought that 
dominate this scholarship.
A. OCS is usually wrong. 
We assume that all sex offenders are monsters and not able to be rehabilitated. 
We assume that advocacy services are plentifully available to all persons 
institutionalized because of mental illness.  We assume that legislation like Kendra’s 
Law will prevent tragedies like the death of Kendra Webdale from recurring.  We 
assume that mental disability law decision-making is done in a neutral way.  We 
108. Falter, 502 F. Supp. at 1185.
109. See Mikk, supra note 21.
110. Id. at 157–59.
111. Id. at 164.
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assume that hospital policies are promulgated for the betterment and general welfare 
of patients.  We assume that quality assurance programs are designed to reduce 
medical error.  In each instance, our OCS is fatally f lawed, and we must first come 
to grips with that stark reality. 
B. Sanism and pretextuality continue to dominate our social policies.
Each of the topics discussed in the articles in this symposium reflects the ways 
that sanism and pretextuality shape all of mental disability law.  There may be no 
area of mental disability law that is more pretextual than that governing the 
incapacitation of sex offenders.112  Our failure to provide meaningful and robust 
advocacy services to all citizens—even in the face of broadly-crafted legal 
mandates—is both sanist and pretextual.113  Legislative reliance on statutory 
interventions such as Kendra’s Law threatens to make this area of the law even more 
pretextual.114  The hospital incident report threatens to be a pretextual device for 
furthering litigation while undermining hospitals’ efforts to improve the rate of error.  
Again, we must confront the sanist and pretextual bases of mental disability law and 
seek to eradicate these factors from our jurisprudence.
C. Issues of mental disability cannot be meaningfully uncoupled from other social  
 issues such as race or class discrimination.
Race, ethnicity, and class matter in all mental disability law decision-making, 
whether we study cohorts in New York City, or elsewhere.  We must accept the fact 
that the notion of neutrality in this area of the law is a myth, and then weigh how 
this insight affects every aspect of this body of law.
D. Therapeutic jurisprudence is a necessary palliative to remediate the factors just  
 discussed.
The TJ filter can be used to shine light on the presence of sanism and pretextuality 
and the false use of OCS in considerations of sex offender law,115 the inadequacy of 
advocacy systems,116 outpatient commitment,117 institutional rights law,118 the right to 
refuse treatment law,119 or health care/hospital law.120  It is, we believe, an obligatory 
112. See generally Perlin, OCS and Heuristic Reasoning, supra note 49.
113. See generally id.
114. See Michael L. Perlin, The Blurring of the Borders Between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, 10 
Waseda Bull. Comp. L. 263 (2007).
115. See, e.g., Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex Offenders: A Psycho-Legal Approach to Protection, 
16 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 351 (2004).
116. See, e.g., Jan Costello, “Why Would I Need a Lawyer?” Legal Counsel and Advocacy for Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, in Law, Mental Health, and Mental Disorder 15 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. 
Shuman eds., 1996).
117 See, e.g., Winick et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 83.
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tool for scholars and advocates to use in their analyses of all of the issues discussed in 
this symposium.
The individuals written about in the essays here are all marginalized.  Their 
marginalization has led to their being treated as somehow less worthy of legal 
protection than others.  For nearly three decades, we have continued to ignore Judge 
Ackerman’s cautionary advice—to treat them “like human beings.”  Over forty-five 
years ago, Bob Dylan wrote about the profundity of equality.  It is time that we take 
Judge Ackerman and Dylan seriously.
118 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 80 
(1995).
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 463 (2002).
